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More than a Footnote in History: The Single-Purpose Container Exception
I. Introduction
The bane of law students and a useful tool for scholars, the lowly footnote has a
long and acrimonious history in scholarly works. Often overlooked by students because
of its perceived insignificance, scholars use the footnote to lend legitimacy to their own
works by adding much-needed authority or credibility. Throughout Supreme Court
opinions, the seemingly trivial footnote can have an ostensibly disproportionate impact
on modern jurisprudence. One1 of the most evident examples of this was in Arkansas v.
Sanders, where the court declared in the thirteenth footnote that a reasonable expectation
of privacy does not extend to certain containers because “their contents can be inferred
from their outward appearance.”2 At first glance, the Sanders footnote may seem as
“innocuous” as the white powder found in United States v. Miller,3 but over 30 years later
courts still wrestle with the application of this footnote. Eventually deemed the “singlepurpose container exception,”4 the Sanders footnote has been construed as an exception
to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, potentially impacting an individual’s
privacy interests.
The Fourth Amendment guards against unreasonable searches and seizures,
specifically providing that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
1

Felix Gilman, The Famous Footnote Four: A History of the Carolene Products Footnote, 46 S. TEX. L.
REV. 163, 165 (stating that footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products Co. “has become the most
famous footnote in constitutional law” and introduced the idea of different levels of scrutiny).
2
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764 n.13 (U.S. 1979), overruled on other grounds by California v.
Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (U.S. 1991).
3
United States v. Miller, 769 F.2d 554, 555 (9th Cir. 1985).
4
Id. at 559.
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or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seize.5
As consistently demonstrated in case law, the Fourth Amendment does not
actually require that searches or seizures be conducted pursuant to a warrant, it merely
mandates “that warrants which may issue shall only issue upon probable cause.”6
Although the Fourth Amendment affords broad protection to individuals from
governmental intrusion, the amendment is subject to several limitations, restricting its
scope. The amendment only protects individuals from “searches” and “seizures”
perpetrated by government agents.7 It does not prohibit searches and seizures conducted
by private persons.8 If an initial search occurs that is not prohibited by the Fourth
Amendment, such as a search conducted by a private party, then a later search by an
officer would not violate the Fourth Amendment as long as it did not exceed the scope of
the original private search.9 Under the amendment, a search occurs when an individual’s
reasonable expectation of privacy is invaded.10 When determining whether a search is
reasonable, the general approach under current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is to
examine the totality of the circumstances.11
Exceptions to the Fourth Amendment12 have been established by the courts where
it has been determined that the public interest requires some flexibility in the application

5

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 427 (U.S. 1981)(Rhenquist J., dissenting), overruled on other
grounds by United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
7
Id. at 113.
8
United States v. Donnes, 947 F.2d 1430, 1434 (10th Cir. 1991).
9
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 115 (U.S. 1984).
10
Id.
11
Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (U.S. 2006)(explaining that the reasonableness of a search “is
determined by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and,
on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”).
12
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 735-736 (U.S. 1983).
6
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of the warrant requirement to searches.13 Due to this need for flexibility, there are “a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions”14 where the protections of the
Warrant Clause may be suspended.15 These exceptions are applied when the societal
costs16 of obtaining a warrant outweigh the need for seeking the impartial opinion of a
magistrate.17
Regardless of these certain exceptions, probable cause is still generally required
for any search or seizure conducted by a police officer.18 When determining whether
probable cause exists, courts have generally moved away from the objective, reasonable
person standard and toward the viewpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer,
giving “due weight to inferences” made by law enforcement officers.19 Probable cause is
a “common-sense standard” that does not require the officer’s belief to actually be
correct.20 Instead, it requires the facts or circumstances before an officer to be of the type
to warrant a reasonably prudent officer to believe that an offense has been committed.21
Once probable cause is established the next inquiry is whether a person retains a
reasonable expectation of privacy.22 Courts are split on the standard used when deciding
whether a container reveals its contents under the single-purpose container exception,
eliminating any reasonable expectation of an individual’s privacy interest.23 This note
examines the history of the single-purpose container and the circuit split it has created.
13

Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759 (U.S. 1979).
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982).
15
Sanders, 442 U.S. at 759.
16
Id. (noting circumstances including “danger to law officers or the risk of loss or destruction of
evidence.”).
17
Id.
18
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (U.S. 1987).
19
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (U.S. 1996).
20
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (U.S. 1983).
21
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161 (U.S. 1925).
22
Stephen Jones, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy: Searches, Seizures, and the Concept of Fourth
Amendment Standing, 27 U. MEM. L. Rev. 907, 914 (1997).
23
United States v. Tejada, 524 F.3d 809, 813 (7th Cir. 2008).
14
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Part II(A) of this note will cover the reasonable expectation of privacy, while Parts II(B)
and II(C) will discuss the plain view doctrine and the single-purpose container exception,
respectively. Part III will examine the circuit split that has been created by the Sanders
footnote. Specifically, Part III(A) will look at the 4th and 7th Circuits’ approach to the
single-purpose exception, which considers the totality of the circumstances, giving due
deference to the subjective inferences made by the searching officer. Part III(B) will look
at the approach taken by the 1st, 5th, 9th, and 10th Circuits, which consider only whether
the outward appearance of a container reveals its contents to a reasonable layperson.
Finally, Part III(C) analyzes the circuit split, arguing that an analysis that focuses solely
on an objective layperson’s inferences is too restrictive, the evaluation of the nature of
the container should be from the perspective of a police officer, accounting for the
officer’s training, expertise, and experience, and that the totality of circumstances should
be weighed in determining the existence of a single-purpose container.

II. Background
A. A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy under the Fourth Amendment
An individual’s right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment is the “right to be
let alone by other people.”24 To determine whether an individual has a Fourth
Amendment privacy right, modern courts apply the reasonable expectation of privacy
test, formulated by Justice Harlan in his concurrence in Katz v. United States.25 The
reasonable expectation of privacy test has two requirements: The person must have an
actual, subjective expectation of privacy, and that expectation must be one that society

24
25

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (U.S. 1967).
Jones, supra note 22, at 914.
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believes is reasonable.26 Prior to Katz, the Supreme Court constricted privacy protection
under the Fourth Amendment only to physical intrusions on tangible objects.27 In Katz,
the Supreme Court parted ways with this narrow view and recognized that Fourth
Amendment protection extended to include intangible items as well.28 The broad
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment adopted by the Katz Court allowed the
amendment to adapt to the contemporary times and marked a “new” way to view an
individual’s right to privacy.29
When determining whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists, courts
must also balance an individual’s privacy rights with the promotion of legitimate
government interests.30 In Maryland v. Buie, the Supreme Court stated, “in determining
reasonableness, we have balanced the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment
interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”31 Under this test,
although a search is generally not reasonable unless it is accompanied by a warrant on
probable cause, there are certain contexts where a warrant or probable cause is not
required for the sake of the public interest.32 One example where the promotion of a
legitimate interest of the government outweighs an individual’s privacy interests under
the Fourth Amendment can be found in Carroll v. United States.33 In Carroll, the
Supreme Court established an exception to the warrant requirement for moving

26

Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan J., concurring).
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465 (U.S. 1928).
28
Katz, 389 U.S. at 355.
29
Jones, supra note 22, at 914 (“Katz represents the “new” way of thinking about the Fourth Amendment
and how it protects individuals.”).
30
Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (U.S. 2006)
31
Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 331 (U.S. 1990).
32
Id.
33
267 U.S. 132, 153 (U.S. 1925)
27
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vehicles.34 The Court stated that it would be impracticable to require officers to obtain a
warrant before searching a vehicle because “the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought,” thus impeding law
enforcement.35 Years later, the Supreme Court would once again find that an individual’s
privacy rights were outweighed by law enforcement’s interests in Terry v. Ohio.36 In
Terry, the Supreme Court upheld a “stop-and-frisk” search of a suspect that was
performed without a warrant or even probable cause.37 The court upheld the search on the
grounds that the officer not only had a reasonable basis to believe that the suspect was
armed, but there was a prevailing public interest in the officer taking swift action.38 In
determining whether the swift action taken by the officer was necessary, the court gave
deference to the experience and subjective inferences made by the officer.39
The surrounding circumstances of a search may also affect a person’s reasonable
expectation of privacy. In California v. Ciraolo, after receiving an anonymous tip, police
officers observed and took pictures of marijuana plants growing in the suspect’s backyard
from a private airplane.40 Based on the pictures taken from the flight, the officers then
obtained a warrant to seize the marijuana plants.41 Considering the circumstances of the
case, the court held that the suspect did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy from
all observations in his backyard.42 Even though the area was within the “curtilage”43 and

34

Id.
Id.
36
392 U.S. 1, 30 (U.S. 1968).
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 23.
40
476 U.S. 207, 209 (U.S. 1986).
41
Id. at 209-10.
42
Id. at 212.
43
United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300(1987)(noting that curtilage originated from common law to
extend to the area immediately surrounding a dwelling. The Fourth Amendment protects the curtilage of a
35
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the suspect had erected a fence to obstruct the public view of the street,44 the court
examined the context of the search and the fact that the marijuana plants were not
enclosed, open to view from the public airspace, as justification for its holding.45
Although Ciraolo may have had a subjective expectation of privacy, since his plants were
open to public view, that expectation was not objectively reasonable and thus was not
protected.46 Like the marijuana plants in Ciraolo, items that can be observed in “plain
view” have no expectation of privacy.

B. The Plain View Doctrine
One of the traditional exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement
is the plain view doctrine. Under the plain view doctrine, there is no invasion of privacy
when an object is observed in plain view of a public space.47 Obviously, when an object
is exposed to the plain view of the public, no reasonable person could have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in that object.48 Therefore, there is no need for a search warrant.49
The doctrine is based on the theory that once a police officer is lawfully in a position to
observe an item,50 and it is exposed to the general public, “its owner's privacy interest in
that item is lost.”51

house. “The extent of the curtilage is determined by factors that bear upon whether an individual
reasonably may expect that the area in question should be treated as the home itself.”).
44
Ciraolo, 476 U.S at 209.
45
Id. at 212-14.
46
Id. at 215.
47
Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 138 (U.S. 1990).
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 328 (U.S. 1987)(stating that “looking at what is already exposed to
view” does not constitute a search).
51
Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (U.S. 1983).
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The plain view doctrine allows a police officer to conduct a warrantless seizure
only when two conditions are met.52 First, as discussed above, the officer must “lawfully
make an initial intrusion or otherwise properly be in a position from which he can view a
particular area.”53 Second, it must be “immediately apparent” to the officer that the items
observed may be subject to seizure.54 Prior to 1990, the plain view doctrine also required
that the evidence discovered by the officer be made “inadvertently.”55 In Horton v.
California, the Supreme Court rejected this third requirement, stating “evenhanded law
enforcement is best achieved by the application of objective standards of conduct, rather
than standards that depend upon the subjective state of mind of the officer.”56
In Arizona v. Hicks, the Supreme Court held that probable cause is required for an
officer seizing an object under the plain view doctrine.57 The court in Hicks reasoned that,
during an unrelated search and seizure, an object should not be seizable on grounds lesser
than those needed to obtain a warrant.58 Since Hicks, courts have “recognized that a law
enforcement officer may rely on his training and experience to draw inferences and make
deductions that might well elude an untrained person.”59 This deferral to police officers
includes their determination of objects within plain view.60 Although deference is given
to officers to determine objects that are in plain view, the Supreme Court has held that the
doctrine would not be extended to general exploratory searches between objects until

52

Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 737 (U.S. 1983).
Id. (internal citations omitted).
54
Id.
55
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467-68 (U.S. 1971).
56
Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 138 (U.S. 1990)(positing that the fact that an officer expects to find
an item of evidence in the course of a search should not invalidate the seizure).
57
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (U.S. 1987)
58
Id. at 327.
59
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 746 (U.S. 1983)(Powell J., concurring).
60
Id.
53
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something incriminating emerges.61 Instead, deference is only given to officers where it is
immediately apparent that they have evidence before them.62
Although the plain view doctrine may allow the warrantless seizure of an item, it
does not allow for a warrantless search of the contents of that item.63 In United States v.
Jacobsen, the Supreme Court stated “even when government agents may lawfully seize
such a package to prevent loss or destruction of suspected contraband, the Fourth
Amendment requires that they obtain a warrant before examining the contents of such a
package.”64 As a general rule, when an officer lawfully seizes a container or package
without a warrant, the officer is still required to obtain a warrant before searching the
item.65 There are several exceptions to this general rule, such as searches incident to a
lawful arrest or inventory searches.66 A lesser-known and more controversial exception
that the courts have established is the single-purpose container exception.

C. The Single-Purpose Container Exception
The single-purpose container exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment was created in footnote thirteen of Arkansas v. Sanders.67 In that footnote,
the Supreme Court posited that not all containers and packages found by police officers
would deserve full protection under the Fourth Amendment.68 The court stated, “some

61

Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 466 (U.S. 1971)(internal quotations omitted).
Id.
63
United States v. Miller, 769 F2d 554, 557 (9th Cir. 1985)(“The plain view exception permits seizure of
incriminating evidence, but does not authorize a warrantless search for concealed evidence.”).
64
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 115 (U.S. 1984).
65
Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 141 n.11 (U.S. 1990)(noting that the seizure of a container under the
plain view doctrine ordinarily “does not compromise the interest in preserving the privacy of its contents
because it may only be opened pursuant to either a search warrant, or one of the well-delineated exceptions
to the warrant requirement.”).
66
Brown, 460 U.S. at 735-36.
67 Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764 n.13 (U.S. 1979).
68
Id.
62
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containers (for example a kit of burglar tools or a gun case) by their very nature cannot
support a reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can be inferred from
their outward appearance.”69 Fundamentally, the court in Sanders stated that not all
containers are “created equal in terms of one’s privacy expectation in them.”70
In Robbins v. California, the Supreme Court expanded upon the exception,
asserting it to be a variation of the plain view doctrine.71 The court’s plurality held that
“unless the container is such that its contents may be said to be in plain view, those
contents are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment.”72 Ordinarily, a warrant is
necessary before police may open a closed container because by concealing the contents
from plain view, the possessor creates a reasonable expectation of privacy.73 But, if the
characteristics or configuration of the container are such that it “proclaims its contents,”
the contents are considered to essentially be in plain view and no reasonable privacy
expectation is present.74 Similar to objects that sit out in the open, exposed to the public,
the contents of some containers are treated like objects observed in plain view. Like items
seized under the plain view doctrine, since the contents of a single-purpose container is
considered to be open to public view, no actual Fourth Amendment “search” occurs when
the container is examined because no expectation of privacy can exist.75 Because single-

69

Id.
United States v. Sylvester, 848 F.2d 520, 524 (5th Cir. 1988).
71
Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 427 (U.S. 1981)
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id. (“If the distinctive configuration of a container proclaims its contents, the contents cannot fairly be
said to have been removed from a searching officer's view.”).
75
United States v. Davis, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 17217, *136 (4th Cir. Aug. 16, 2012)(stating that since
the contents of the container was a foregone conclusion to the officer, his “observation of those contents
did not constitute a search, and thus a search warrant was unnecessary”).
70
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purpose containers so clearly announce their contents to an observer, they are effectively
transparent.76
Applying the Sanders footnote, the Robbins court held that the single-purpose
container exception did not justify the warrantless search of packages described as
“plastic wrapped green blocks” that were found in the defendant's trunk.77 In coming to
its decision, the plurality disregarded that the officers had smelled marijuana smoke when
the defendant opened his car door; that marijuana and drug paraphernalia was found in
the passenger compartment of the car; and the suspect’s statements to the officer.78 The
conviction was overturned because the prosecution could not establish that marijuana was
ordinarily “packaged this way.”79 Instead, the court’s reasoning countered the officer’s
testimony that “contraband was often wrapped in this fashion.”80
In Texas v. Brown, the Supreme Court applied a different rationale to uphold the
warrantless seizure of opaque balloons containing heroin.81 Unlike the court in Robbins,
the Brown court took into consideration the circumstances surrounding the container and
the experience of the officer, holding that “the distinctive character of the balloon itself
spoke volumes as to its contents – particularly to the trained eye of the officer.”82
Although the majority in Brown did not reference the Sanders footnote and the single-

United States v. Corral, 970 F.2d 719, 725 (10th Cir. 1992)(“[W]here the contents of a seized container
are a foregone conclusion, [the] prohibition against the warrantless searches of containers under the plain
view doctrine does not apply.”).
77
Robbins 453 U.S. at 428.
78
Id at 422, 428.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 442 (Rehnquist J., dissenting).
81
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 744 (U.S. 1983).
82
Id. at 742 (emphasis added).
76
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purpose container exception, Justice Stevens’s concurrence posited, “the balloon could be
one of those rare single-purpose containers.”83
Prior to Robbins and Brown, the Supreme Court briefly addressed the singlepurpose container exception in a footnote in Walter v. United States.84 In Walter, FBI
agents conducted a warrantless search of a film box, inadvertently shipped to the wrong
address, which depicted pornographic images and had explicit descriptions of the
contents.85 The court held the government search to be unreasonable because Walter’s
expectation of privacy should have been measured at the time he originally sent the
container.86 Since the film boxes sent were securely wrapped and had no markings
indicating its contents, Walter had an expectation of privacy.87 Although the court held
the search to be unreasonable, the majority made the comparison to a gun case being
delivered in the mail, noting that if the package had simply been a gun case there would
be no expectation of privacy in that container.88 But, if that same gun were delivered in a
locked, nondescript suitcase, then there would be an expectation of privacy in its
contents.89 Applying the comparison to the facts of the case, had the film boxes not been
in a container and had been mailed directly, it is likely that there would be no expectation
of privacy in those containers and thus could have been searched by the FBI agents. This
comparison could only be made if the FBI agents were allowed to consider the labels and
depictions of the box making the film box’s incriminating contents immediately

83

Id. at 751 (Stevens J., concurring).
Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 658 n.12 (U.S. 1980).
85
Id. at 651-52.
86
Id. at 658 n.12.
87
Id. at 658-59.
88
Id. at 658 n.12
89
Id.
84
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apparent.90 Since the Supreme Court has not directly addressed this issue, or a concrete
application of the Sanders footnote altogether,91 circuit courts have inconsistently applied
the single-purpose container exception, creating a circuit split.

III. Analysis of The Circuit Split
All circuits agree on the constitutionality of the single-purpose container
exception, but they disagree on how to determine the existence of a single-purpose
container and whether the circumstances surrounding the search can be considered in
making that determination.92 The 4th and 7th Circuits take the viewpoint that whether a
container reveals its contents is determined by not only the configuration of the container
itself, but the surrounding circumstances, including the officer’s knowledge and
experience.93 The 1st, 5th, 9th, and 10th Circuits have taken the approach that the
existence of a single-purpose container should be determined from an objective,
reasonable person perspective and the extrinsic circumstances of the search should not be
taken into consideration.94

90

Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 736-37 (U.S. 1983)(stating that in order to seize an object in plain view
the incriminating nature of the item must be immediately apparent).
91
United States v. Miller, 769 F2d 554, 559 (9th Cir. 1985)(discussing the Supreme Court’s interpretation
of the single-purpose container exception in Robbins).
92
Compare United States v. Gust, 405 F3d 797, 803 (9th Cir 2005)(holding that “courts should assess the
nature of a container primarily with reference to general social norms rather than solely . . . by the
experience and expertise of law enforcement officers”) (quotation marks omitted), quoting United States v.
Miller, 769 F2d 554, 560 (9th Cir. 1985) with United States v. Williams, 41 F.3d 192, 196-97 (4th Cir
1994) (holding that a detective's experience could be used in assessing the character of a container).
93
Allison M. Lucier, Comment, You Can Judge a Container by Its Cover: The Single-purpose Container
Exception and the Fourth Amendment, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1809, 1820.
94
Id.
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A. The 4th and 7th Circuit Approach
In United States v. Williams, the 4th Circuit upheld an officer’s search of
packages that were heavily wrapped in cellophane and a layer of brown opaque
material.95 The court reasoned that the packages closely resembled packages containing
narcotics regularly seized by law enforcement.96 The court noted that the suitcase the
packages were found in contained only dirty blankets and towels, items not typical when
a person is traveling.97 The court also considered the fact that the officer conducting the
search had ten years of experience in drug enforcement and, based on that experience, the
officer testified that similarly wrapped packages had “always” contained narcotics.98 This
novel approach taken by the 4th Circuit was substantially different than the approaches
taken by any other circuit applying the single-purpose container exception at that time.99
Then, in United States v. Davis, the 4th Circuit reaffirmed and strengthened its
position that an officer’s knowledge and the surrounding circumstances may be taken into
consideration when determining whether the contents of a container are immediately
apparent.100 In Davis, the defendant was charged with murder after his DNA was a “cold
hit” with DNA found at a murder scene.101 Four years prior, the defendant had previously
been shot in the leg and at the hospital an officer searched the plastic hospital bag
containing the defendant’s clothes.102 The blood on the defendant’s clothes was later used

95

United States v. Williams, 41 F.3d 192, 198 (4th Cir. 1994).
Id.
97
Id. (“[T]he contents of the suitcase also spoke volumes.”).
98
Id. at 194.
99
Compare United States v. Williams, 41 F.3d 192, 198 (4th Cir. 1994)(considering the searching officer’s
years of experience and the “very unusual” items that accompanied the container) with United States v.
Miller, 769 F.2d 554, 560 (9th Cir. 1985)(rejecting the assertion that the searching officer’s “considerable
experience and expertise in drug enforcement” made the contents apparent).
100
United States v. Davis, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 17217, *21 (4th Cir. Aug. 16, 2012).
101
Id. at *3-*9.
102
Id.
96
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to create a DNA profile when he was suspected of committing a previous murder.103 The
court noted the officer’s knowledge of the hospital’s practice of placing patients’ clothing
in a bag on the shelf under the bed, the fact that the officer was aware the defendant was
shot in the leg, and that defendant only had a hospital gown on as reasons why the
contents of the bag were a forgone conclusion and could be searched.104 The fact that the
bloody clothing with a bullet hole would be incriminating evidence against the shooter
was also immediately apparent, to both the officer and the court.105
In United States v. Tejada, the 7th Circuit noted the circuit split but decided not to
expressly take any one side because the search of a bag containing cocaine had already
been validated by inevitable discovery.106 Although the court did not explicitly take a side
in the circuit split, the court in dicta conjectured that requiring a warrant to search a
container when its contents are known to contain contraband or other incriminating
evidence “is far from the core of the Fourth Amendment.107 Additionally, based on the
7th Circuit’s previous opinion in United States v. Cardona-Rivera, the court would likely
examine the surrounding circumstances in deciding whether a container revealed its
contents. In United States v. Cardona-Rivera, the 7th Circuit upheld the search and
seizure of packages that were recognized by the officers as “bricks” of cocaine.108 The
court noted that once the defendant disclosed that the container held contraband, there
was no reasonable privacy interest that could be invaded when the officers opened the
package, regardless if a warrant was present.109 In Cardona-Rivera, Judge Posner also
103

Id.
Id. at *23.
105
Id. at *25.
106
524 F.3d 809, 813 (7th Cir. 2008).
107
Id. at 814.
108
United States v. Cardona-Rivera, 904 F.2d 1149, 1154 (7th Cir. 1990).
109
Id. at 1156.
104

15

noted that if the question of when a container revealed its contents were presented to the
Supreme Court, a majority of Justices would likely take into consideration the
circumstances surrounding the container.110
The 4th and 7th Circuits take a practical approach to determining the existence of
a single-purpose container. The two circuits recognize that containers are not found in a
vacuum and are willing to consider the surrounding circumstances prior to the search.
Distinctive configuration, labels and disclosures made by suspects, the proximity of
contraband, and the subjective inferences based on prior experience made by the
searching officer will all be taken into account to determine whether the contents of a
container are a forgone conclusion.

B. The 1st, 5th, 9th, and 10th Circuits’ Approach
The approach taken by the other circuits in applying the exception is drastically
different than that taken by the 4th and 7th Circuits. In United States v. Meada, the 1st
Circuit applied a reasonable layperson standard in deciding whether firearms and
ammunition found in several closed containers, which, in the context of the case,
belonged to a convicted felon that was prohibited from owning such items, received a
privacy expectation.111 The court held that the defendant did have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the ammunition can because the appearance of the can itself did
not reveal its contents to the average person.112 Although the defendant had an
expectation of privacy in the ammunition can, the court ruled any privacy interests the
Id. at 1155 (“Several Justices -- almost certainly a majority -- believe however that if the shape or other
characteristics of the container, taken together with the circumstances in which it is seized (from a
suspected drug dealer, or a harmless old lady?), proclaim its contents unambiguously, there is no need to
obtain a warrant.”).
111
408 F.3d 14, 24 (1st Cir. 2005).
112
Id. at 19.
110
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contents of the container holding the firearms was eliminated because the container was
“readily identifiable as a gun case and included a ‘GUN GUARD’ label.”113 While the 1st
Circuit limited the application of single-purpose container in Meada, the court did not
completely eliminate its application. The court rejected Meada’s argument that if a
container could potentially hold other items it did not clearly reveal its contents, noting
that the Sanders exception would have no applicability if such a scenario could defeat
it.114
The 5th Circuit has taken an even narrower approach than the 1st Circuit when
determining the existence of a single-purpose container. In United States v. Sylvester, the
5th Circuit held that a container whose contents could not be deduced simply by looking
at it fell outside of the scope of the Sanders footnote.115 The defendants in Sylvester were
cited for hunting on a baited field after a U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service agent searched
through the defendant’s “hunting box” near the baited area.116 The court reasoned that
although ammunition may often be carried in such boxes, the contents could not be
inferred from the outward appearance of the box.117 Unlike the 1st Circuit in the
aforementioned case, the 5th Circuit has held that labels on a container, do not
necessarily destroy an individual’s privacy interest in that container.118 According to the
5th Circuit, even disclosures made by defendants about the contents of a container do not
destroy a defendant’s privacy expectation.119 In United States v. Villarreal, customs
agents searched a fifty-five gallon drum labeled as phosphoric acid without a warrant and
113
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found marijuana inside.120 The 5th Circuit held that although the drum was labeled, the
label itself does not transform the container into a single-purpose container, allowing an
officer to search its contents.121 The court in Villarreal also stated that even when a
defendant informed a police officer of the contents of the container, he still preserved his
privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment.122 The 5th Circuit departed from every other
circuit in Villarreal by holding that the label on a container would not even be considered
as part of the “outward appearance” of the container.123 The 5th Circuit’s approach in
Villarreal is by far the narrowest of any court’s application of the single-purpose
container, nearly destroying the exception altogether.
The 9th Circuit joined the circuit split over the Sanders footnote in United States
v. Miller where a Drug Enforcement Agency officer searched a clear plastic bag owned
by the suspect that had punctured, spilling a white powder.124 Although the white powder
tested negative for cocaine in a field test, upon further examination of the bag, the officer
found an opaque, fiberglass container that enclosed crystalline cocaine.125 The 9th Circuit
held that although the initial seizure of the bag was lawful under the plain view doctrine,
the warrantless search of the bag was not.126 The court stated that since “the bag did not
have a distinctive shape or odor that identified its contents” it did not “announce to the
observer” that it contained contraband and therefore could not be considered a singlepurpose container.127 The court rejected the government’s assertion that the contents of
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the bag were obvious to the searching officer because the circumstances surrounding the
discovery of the bag and the officer’s “considerable experience and expertise in drug
enforcement” made the contents apparent.128 In coming to its conclusion, the court
distinguished the Supreme Court’s decisions in Brown129 and Jacobsen130 on the grounds
that those cases involved seizures rather than searches of a container, possibly implying
that only the seizure of a single-purpose container may be based on an officer’s
experience and training.131
The 9th Circuit would later reestablish its stance that the viewpoint of a
reasonable layman should be used in determining the existence of a single-purpose
container in United States v. Gust.132 In Gust, The court found that a defendant’s shotgun
case was not a single-purpose container because “a layperson would not be able to infer
the contents of the case based on its outward appearance alone.”133 The court disregarded
the fact that the officers had received reports of gunshots in the area, that they both had
first-hand experiences with similar gun cases, and that the label “BUSHMASTER,” the
name of a manufacturer and distributor of firearms, appeared on the case.134 The court
also noted concerns that officers may abuse their discretion if the single-purpose
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container exception were to apply without the restriction of the objective layperson as a
standard.135
The 10th Circuit joined the fray over the single-purpose container exception in
United States v. Bonitz when the court rejected the contention that an officer’s experience
should be taken into consideration when a container reveals its contents.136 In Bonitz, The
court ruled that the hard plastic case that held an AR-15 rifle did not reveal its contents
even though a firearms expert or the officers conducting the search may have been able to
identify the plastic case as a gun case.137 A vigorous dissent by Judge Baldock advocated
for a more subjective approach, stating that the officers could reasonably surmise the
contents of the container based on their experience, specialized knowledge, and the
context in which the container was found.138 Although the majority in Bonitz determined
that an officer’s experience could not be used to determine the existence of a singlepurpose container, Judge Baldock’s dissent indicated a potential divide among the circuit
as to whether surrounding circumstances could be used to infer the contents of a
container.
Four years later, in United States v. Donnes, the 10th Circuit approached the issue
once again and reasserted its previous holding in Bonitz that only the configuration of the
container itself would be considered when determining the existence of a single-purpose
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container.139 In Donnes, the court held that an opaque, leather camera case did not qualify
as a single-purpose container even though a syringe accompanied it, in plain view, when
the container was initially found.140 The court held that since the bindles of
methamphetamines were found in a closed camera lens case made of black leather, that
was placed inside a glove, and located on the floor of his house, “the defendant clearly
manifested a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the camera lens
case.”141 Relying on Bonitz, the court casted doubt on whether the single-purpose
container exception could ever be applied at all,142 stating that a container reveals its
contents under the single-purpose exception only when the container is either not closed,
transparent, or has a distinctive configuration.143 The 10th Circuit reasoned that if it gave
weight to the fact that the lens case was found with a syringe it would essentially “permit
a warrantless search of any container found in the vicinity of a suspicious item.”144 Such
an expansion on the single-purpose container exception would likely increase the amount
of warrantless searches of nondescript containers as long as the container was found near
an item that could be considered suspicious.145
As described above, the majority of circuits take an approach to the singlepurpose container exception that is much narrower than the 4th and 7th Circuits’
approach. Instead of considering the extrinsic circumstances around the container, these
circuits consider only the distinctive configuration of the container itself. When
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determining whether a container is a single-purpose container, the majority of circuits do
not consider the searching officer’s experience or subjective inferences, opting for a
reasonable person standard instead.

C. Resolution to the Circuit Split
1. An analysis that focuses solely on an objective layperson’s inferences is too
restrictive.
A judicial approach that only considers how a reasonable layperson would view a
container is too narrow of an approach if it does not consider the context in which the
container was found or the surrounding circumstances. Situations often arise where there
could be no reasonable expectation of privacy because the extrinsic circumstances around
the container make its contents a foregone conclusion. For example, this type of situation
arose in Gust when a suspect explicitly told the officer that there was a gun inside a
suspicious looking container.146 An admission of the sort should have been considered a
waiver of the suspect’s privacy interest, since the officer was effectively certain of the
container’s contents.147 Under the approach taken by the court in Gust, however, the
admission by the suspect was not even considered because the court only looked at the
container on its face, not the context in which it was found.148
An objective layperson perspective is also prone to as many, if not more,
inconsistencies as the subjective officer perspective. For example, there have been
inconsistent rulings where a suspect owned a gun case with the name of a firearm
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manufacturer labeled on its exterior. In those cases, courts have disagreed over whether a
layperson would be able to recognize the label and the firearm case.149 In all three
instances, however, the officers were able to determine that the cases contained a gun
because of their prior experiences with firearms.150

2. The nature of the container should be determined from the perspective of a police
officer and should account for the officer’s training, expertise, and experience.
The deference the single-purpose container exception provides to officers is
undeniably beneficial to society because the productivity and efficiency of law
enforcement increase as less time and resources are devoted to seeking search warrants.
An evaluation from the perspective of the searching police officer provides indisputable
flexibility to law enforcement. Decisions regarding whether a container clearly
announced its contents are more easily made when officers are able to factor in their
experience and the circumstances surrounding the discovery of the container. An
objective layperson analysis requires a police officer to perform the difficult task of
deciding if a container qualifies as a single-purpose container without taking into account
his or her own experience or the circumstances.151 Instead, this standard forces officers to
pretend that they are laypeople, something they are not and which is not easy to achieve.
Any officer necessarily “views the facts through the lens of his police experience and
expertise.”152 When determining the contents of a container, it would be unrealistic to
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expect an officer to separate himself from his experiences and first-hand knowledge. Not
only that, but it would also be impractical to expect an officer to view specific containers
from a layperson’s perspective, since law enforcement officers are specifically trained to
make determinations as to the possible contents of suspicious containers.
Officers are often given deference in their daily decision making because of their
ability to spot incriminating activity.153 Because of their career experience, training, and
first-hand knowledge, law enforcement officers are better equipped than a layperson in
determining the types of containers or methods used for criminal activity.154 A trained
law enforcement officer has the ability to use objective facts that may seem insignificant
to a layperson and use those facts to form a legitimate suspicion of a person or package
that may be acted on.155 The belief that considering the subjective perspective of a police
officer to be a “sham” is simply unfounded.156 The concern that using a subjective
determination allows officers to act on a hunch, and when “the hunch proves to be correct
and the arrest bears fruit, the court will hold . . . that the record firmly supports the
detective’s inference,”157 is actually counter to what the Supreme Court has held in the
past.158 When considering an officer’s subjective assessment of a situation, the court has
held that “due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or
‘hunch,’ but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 603 (2006)(Kennedy J., concurring)(“Our system, as the Court
explains, has developed procedures for training police officers and imposing discipline for failures to act
competently and lawfully.”).
154
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facts in light of his experience.”159 In Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court upheld an on-thestreet search, or a “stop-and-frisk,” by a police officer as being reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment.160 In coming to its decision, the court examined the officer’s
observations of the suspect, which led to the subsequent search.161 Like the searching
officer in Terry, even when an officer subjectively believes that a container holds
contraband, he will still be required to point to specific facts that established his belief.162
If the inferences made by the officer are not reasonable, then it is unlikely that the court
will uphold the search.
Requiring an officer to obtain a warrant to search a container that he is virtually
certain contains contraband or incriminating evidence can have negative implications on
law enforcement.163 Well-intentioned mistakes in the application of the single-purpose
container exception by law enforcement officers can have significant consequences since
the punishment for failure to obtain a search warrant can lead to the suppression of highly
relevant evidence.164 Confusion among officers between the application of the plain view
doctrine and its byproduct, the single-purpose container exception, could expectedly lead
to police error and the suppression of important evidence.165 In order to seize an object
under the plain view doctrine, the officer must be in a lawful position to view the item
and the incriminating nature of the item must be immediately apparent.166 When
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determining whether the item’s incriminating nature is immediately apparent, the officer
“may rely on his training and experience to draw inferences and make deductions that
might well elude an untrained person.”167 Allowing an officer to use his experience and
training to seize an item in plain view but requiring that officer to use a layperson’s
perspective to determine whether that same item can be searched creates two conflicting
standards that may cause confusion and impede law enforcement.168 In Acevedo, the
Supreme Court overturned Sanders because it conflicted with the Carroll-doctrine cases
and caused confusion among the courts and officers, obstructing effective law
enforcement.169 The court reasoned that it would be more efficient to adopt a single,
clear-cut rule to govern automobile searches.170 Likewise, adopting one clear-cut standard
in deciding when an item is siezable under the plain view doctrine and searchable as a
single-purpose container would remove confusion by police officers and reduce
inconsistencies among the courts.171 Although an individual’s privacy rights from
seizures is distinct from their privacy rights from searches, the opening of a container is
not generally seen as being that much more intrusive than the seizure of the same
container.172 Since the privacy distinction between a search and a seizure under the
Fourth Amendment is minute, a plain view interpretation that allows an officer to search
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a container when there is solid evidence of the container’s contents should be attractive to
courts and officers alike.173
Permitting law enforcement officers to rely on their expertise and professional
knowledge in determining whether a container reveals it contents under the singlepurpose container exception properly balances individual privacy concerns and
government interests. Requiring an officer to obtain a warrant to search a package or
container in which they have probable cause or considerable evidence to believe that the
package contains some type of contraband can substantially frustrate law enforcement
efforts.174 The ability of an officer to obtain a warrant is not always as easy as making a
quick, half-mile trip to the nearest precinct.175 The time expended on the process to
secure a search warrant for a container the officer is virtually certain contains contraband
is an inefficient use of police resources as that time could be spent on patrol, investigating
crimes, or making arrests.176 Overall, the productivity and efficiency of law enforcement
would increase as less time and resources are devoted to obtaining search warrants.
Additionally, an individual’s privacy rights are not necessarily sacrificed when an officer
uses his expertise to determine the existence of a single-purpose container under the
Sanders footnote. Containers that fall under the single-purpose container exception are
“rare.”177 Although it is possible that the scope of the exception may extend to more
packages or containers when applying the specialized knowledge of a police officer, any
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expansion would be minimal. It would be unlikely that the characteristics of nondescript
containers, like a backpack or a purse, could “proclaim its contents,” even to the trained
eye of an officer.178

3. The totality of circumstances should be weighed in determining the existence of a
single-purpose container.
The surrounding circumstances and the context in which a container is found
should be taken into consideration because these containers are not found in a vacuum. It
would be unreasonable to expect an officer to view each container he or she comes across
as being in a bubble, separate from the outside world. Circumstances and locations often
play a major part in determining whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists.179
For example, an individual’s expectation of privacy changes when the person is in a
vehicle or in their home.180 In the home, an unlabeled gun case may also be mistaken for
a violin case. But if that same case were to be found in or near a gun range, it would be
almost a foregone conclusion to most people that the case contained a firearm.181 To use
another example, it would also be inconsistent to say that a person that places wrapped
cellophane “bricks” or a gun case next to another incriminating item, like a syringe, still
observes a reasonable expectation of privacy. Considering the surrounding circumstances
of a search is not unfounded as an approach to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. In fact,
it is the prevailing Supreme Court-created doctrine. For example, in Terry, the Court not
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only considered the observations made by the officer prior to the search, but also
considered the officer’s years of experience on the force.182 After weighing all these
facts, including the competing privacy interests of the defendant, the Court came to the
conclusion that the warrantless search was reasonable.183
Courts, such as the 10th Circuit in Donnes, have been reluctant to include the
context in which the container is found because of a concern that it may “permit a
warrantless search of any container found in the vicinity of a suspicious item.”184 This
trepidation expressed by the 10th Circuit overstates the case. Containers that have
nondescript characteristics, like a cardboard box, found in the vicinity of contraband,
could never be considered a single-purpose container since the character of the container
would not change regardless of its location.185 Unexceptional containers, like a cardboard
box, are used to carry an infinite variety of items. Although a box that is accompanied by
incriminating evidence, like a syringe or white powder, may be more likely to carry
contraband, nothing about the characteristics of the box change.186 Outside of specific
disclosures made by the owner of the box, the surrounding context of where the box is
found is unlikely to make the characteristics of the box incriminating. Moreover,
considering the totality of circumstances in which a container is found safeguards against
such unconstitutional searches since the vicinity of contraband in which the container is
found may be only a single, non-dispositve factor amongst a multitude of other factors
the court will consider.
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Once a suspect discloses information about the contents of a container to an
officer, their privacy interest in that container is frustrated under the Fourth
Amendment.187 In Jacobsen, the Supreme Court stated that once a defendant reveals
information to another, there is an assumed risk that the person may later reveal that
information to government agents.188 A government agent is not prohibited from acting
on that information under the Fourth Amendment because it then becomes “nonprivate”
information.189 Likewise, if a person were to disclose information to an officer directly, a
reasonable expectation of privacy could no longer exist because that information would
become nonprivate. It would be illogical for an officer to disregard comments made by a
defendant concerning the contents of the container. In Cardona-Rivera the suspect
admitted that there was cocaine in the container prior to the officer’s search.190 Since
such disclosure would make the contents of the container readily apparent (even to a
layman), an officer should be able to search the container without a warrant.
A label on the outside of a container is comparable to disclosures made by the
owner of the container.191 Like information revealed by the owner, a label on a container
is nonprivate information since it appears on the outside of the container for the world to
see. Labeling a plain, black case “GUN GUARD,” “Phoenix Arms,” or
“BUSHMASTER” removes the owner’s expectation that the contents will remain
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private.192 Since the information is nonprivate and because a label reveals the intended
purpose of the container, a government agent should be able to act on it. These type of
containers fall directly into the category of single-purpose containers under the Sanders
footnote because “their contents can be inferred from their outward appearance.”193

IV. Conclusion
The bedrock of American’s privacy rights, the Fourth Amendment requires all
government searches to be reasonable.194 When determining the reasonableness of an
individual’s privacy expectations, courts must be cognizant of the balance between an
individual’s right to privacy and the legitimate interests of the government.195 Any court
decision must balance these competing interests. It is also not sufficient that an individual
has a subjective expectation of privacy. That expectation must also be one that is
objectively considered reasonable.196
A variation of the plain view doctrine, the single-purpose container exception is
an efficient tool for police officers. The deference the exception provides to officers is
beneficial to society because as less time and resources are devoted to seeking search
warrants, more time can be spent on patrol, investigating crimes, and making arrests. The
exception allows law enforcement officials to quickly locate and remove contraband on
the street. In the overwhelming majority of cases involving the single-purpose container
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exception, the officers’ expertise and experience did not lead them astray.197 In each case,
the officers’ insights were accurate and the containers in question were found to have
contraband when searched.198 It would also be unworkable to force upon officers the
difficult task of making these important determinations without taking into account the
officer’s experience199 or the surrounding circumstances.200 Since law enforcement
officers are specifically trained to make these types of determinations, courts should
weigh the subjective knowledge and experience of the searching officer when
determining the existence of a single-purpose container.
The totality of circumstances should also be considered when making the
determination of whether a container reveals its contents. Containers are never found
separate from the rest of the world. Court precedent has often considered the totality of
the circumstances in other cases involving warrantless searches or seizures pursuant to
the Fourth Amendment.201 It seems only logical to allow officers to consider the context
in which the container is found when determining whether it is one of the “rare”202
single-purpose containers. Disclosures about the contents of a container, either through
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the suspect directly or through the labels on a container, are also nonprivate information
that an officer should be able to act on.203
Considering the totality of circumstances while deferring to the expertise and
experience of the searching officer properly balances an individual’s privacy rights under
the Fourth Amendment with legitimate government interests. Deference to a police
officer’s expertise allows law enforcement the flexibility to make on-the-spot
determinations, promoting a government interest in public safety. While police deference
may seem to tip the scale in favor of the government, the totality of circumstances test
prevents this by requiring the inferences made by an officer be only one of many factors,
preserving an individual’s privacy rights. Considering either element alone may allow
one interest to outweigh the other, but by implementing both factors together the scale is
properly balanced.
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